A CALL FOR A SIMPLER APPROACH: EXAMINING
THE NLRA'S SECTION 10(j) STANDARD
Richard B. Lappt
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1947, Congress, in an attempt to curtail the growing power of
organized labor, passed the Taft-Hartley Act (the "Act").' Included in the
many significant provisions of the Act was Congress' explicit approval of
the labor injunction. Through sections 10(j) and 10(1) of the Act, Congress
had, after fifteen years, returned limited power to the federal courts to
adjudicate and enjoin labor controversies.
However, despite over fifty years experience, no clear, consistent
standard has emerged to guide the courts, much less litigants, as to when
injunctive relief is warranted. Instead, there is a patchwork of varying,
inconsistent standards and decisions, increased costs and, possibly worst of
all, injunctions issued without regard to the historical purposes of equitable
relief. The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board") has
exploited this unsettled situation, militating for a standard in section 10(j)
cases which provides the Board unwarranted and undue deference in
deciding such cases.
By creating sections 10() and 10(1), Congress never intended to
supplant the lengthy history of equitable relief or rewrite the consistently
applied and well-established standards governing the appropriateness of
injunctive relief. Rather, Congress had a more limited but nonetheless
ambitious goal: allowing, on a limited basis, the use of injunctions to
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1. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1988)).
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remedy particularly egregious and harmful employer and union unfair labor
practices. As illustrated recently by Hirsch v. Dorsey Trailers, Inc.,2 the
judiciary has struggled for over fifty years with the basic essence and
meaning of sections 10(j) and 10(1). Most significantly, this struggle has
centered on finding the proper balance between the power of the federal
courts to issue interim relief and the authority and expertise of the National
Labor Relations Board in shaping and interpreting the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA").
In Hirsch, Dorsey Trailers, Inc., a manufacturer of dump and flatbed
trailers, employed nearly 200 unionized workers at its Northumberland,
Pennsylvania, plant. 3 In June of 1995, during negotiations for a new
collective bargaining agreement, the union struck, alleging unfair labor
practices were being committed by the company.4 In November of 1995,
the company notified the union of its decision to shut down the plant and
resume operations in Georgia.
In late December of 1995, the
Northumberland plant shut down and the company resumed operations in
6
Georgia and later in South Carolina. Over a year later, in January of 1997,
the NLRB petitioned the district court for a section 10(0) injunction to stop
the company from selling the Northumberland plant before the Board ruled
on the merits of the unfair labor practice charges.7 The Board sought to
maintain the status quo and thus preserve the remedy of restoration should
it ultimately decide against the company.
In July of 1997 the district court denied the Board's request, primarily
because maintaining the vacant plant would have been extremely costly
(maintenance costs exceeded $130,000 in six months) and workers in
Georgia and South Carolina could lose their jobs. 8 The Third Circuit,
however, overruled the district court and held that the critical determination
"is whether, absent an injunction, the Board's ability to facilitate peaceful
management-labor negotiations will be impaired." 9 Since the company
could sell the plant before the Board ruled on unfair labor practice charges,
the court of appeals reasoned, the Board's remedy of restoration would
become "toothless."'1 Emphasizing deference to the Board and reiterating
that irreparable harm to the respondent need not be considered, the court
issued the section 10j) injunction."
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

147 F.3d 243 (3d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id. (quoting Pascarell v. Vibra Screw Inc., 904 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Id. at 248.
Id. at249.
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The battle between the district court and the court of appeals as to how
to analyze and interpret section 10(j) in Hirsch is representative of an
ongoing conflict among the courts, and continues to unnecessarily plague
section 10(j) litigation. This article advocates a simple, straightforward
approach to section 10(j) injunctions, one which uses traditionally applied
standards governing when equitable relief is necessary. Such an approach
would eliminate confusion, give litigants a clear understanding of the
governing standards and level the playing field between the Board and
respondents.
Il.

HISTORY OF LABOR INJUNCTIONS

To fully understand the policy and reasoning behind the legislative
creation of sections 100) and 10(l) of the Act, and to place these
enactments in proper perspective, one must first briefly review and
understand the labor injunction's history of use and abuse. The unrestricted
utilization of labor injunctions in American jurisprudence had a short, but
troubled, history. Yet it is this history that forms the judicial rationale that
permeates the analysis of modern day labor injunctions.
The earliest reported labor injunction case was tried in 1806 when
Philadelphia shoemakers were criminally indicted for striking for higher
wages. 2 The jury was charged that "a combination of workmen to raise
their wages may be considered from a two-fold point of view; one is to
benefit themselves, the other to injure those who do not join their society.
The rule of law condemns both. 1 3 The trouble with the labor injunction
had begun.
In 1896, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued an
injunction against picketing because such conduct had the effect of
interfering with an employer's freedom of contract and the right to employ
individuals at an agreeable wage. 14 The Court viewed the workers'
picketing as a private nuisance and therefore declared it to be unlawful. 5
In dissent, then-Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes called for instruction from
the legislature, explaining:
The true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of
social advantage, and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be
attained merely by logic and general propositions of law which
nobody disputes. Propositions as to public policy rarely are
12. See ARCHnIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 14 (12th ed.
1996).
13. Id. (quoting The Philadelphia Cordwainers' Case, 3 COMMoNS & GILMORE, Doc.
HIsT. AM. IND. Soc. 59-248 (1910-11)).
14. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
15. Id. at 1078.
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unanimously accepted, and still more rarely, if ever, are capable
of unanswerable proof .... One of the eternal conflicts out of
which life is made up is that between the effort of every man to
get the most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised
under the name of capital, to get his services for the least possible
return. Combination on the one side is patent and powerful.
Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal
way ....
If it be true that workingmen may combine with a
view, among other things, to getting as much as they can for their
labor, just as capital may combine with a view to getting the
greatest possible return, it must be true that, when combined, they
have the same liberty that combined capital has, to support their
interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of
those advantages which they otherwise lawfully control. 6
Because of the basic public policy issues that were presented by labor
disputes, judges, with no statutory guidance, were forced to make value
judgments about economic conflicts. As Professor Archibald Cox and
others observed about the post-Civil War period:
[I]t seems fair to say that when the labor disputes engendered by
the conflict over union organization were taken to the courts, the
judges were substantially free, despite the scattered precedents, to
create new law appropriate to the new occasion, guided only by
the vague "principles"
which emerged from rulings upon more
17
familiar situations.
Not guided by statutes or common law dealing with labor issues, the
courts relied on existing rules of equity and tort law to guide their
decisionmaking.18 The inherent question seemed to be whether the selfinterest of the worker was a legitimate purpose, or whether a judicial
balancing of the economic interests of workers, employers, and the public
was to prevail.1 9
16. Id. at 1080-81.
17. COXETAL., supra note 12, at 14.
18. See FELIx FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION 54 (1930);
see also Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900) (relying on tort and criminal law);
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (Mass. 1842) (relying on tort law).
19. In EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, Pomeroy states:
The courts have thus been required to face such questions as the nature and
extent of the capitalist's right in the management of his business and of the
workingman's property in his labor; to decide how far the employer shall be
protected in his right to have labor and custom flow to him free from the
interference of third parties... to determine what limits shall be placed upon
the individuals and combinations of individuals in seeking their economic
advancement at the expense of their fellows. All these and other problems have
come before the courts in rapid succession.
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By the beginning of the twentieth century, trade unions, led by the
American Federation of Labor, had established a secure foothold in the
American labor landscape. 20 With the growth of unions came an increase
in the volume of labor litigation. Injunctions became a commonly used
instrument in labor-management disputes.
Throughout the 1920s,
encouraged by the sympathetic response of the judiciary, employers used
the injunction tool with increasing frequency to squelch labor unrest.2
Before 1931, federal and state judges issued over 1,800 labor-related
injunctions.22
For labor, there were several problems with the treatment of the labor
injunction. 23 The basis for obtaining relief was through affidavits supplied
by the employer, many times on an ex parte basis. 24 Orders by the courts
prohibited striking and picketing on the ground that irreparable harm would
be caused to the employer.2' Labor unions began to complain that courts
sought to deal with violence by injunction and citation for contempt instead
of leaving the protection of persons and property to the normal processes of
criminal law. Unions also complained of the doctrines under which the
misconduct of a few individuals was attributed to the labor organizations
that sponsored a strike or picket line. To make matters worse, union
agitators were sometimes tried for contempt by the same judge who issued
the injunction.2 6 The final blow for labor was the Supreme Court's limiting
JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 2018 (2d ed.),
reprintedin 5 POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES, at 4565

(1919).
20. COX ET AL., supra note 12, at 36.
21. As two commentators wrote:
In the administration of justice between employer and employee, [the
injunction] has become the central lever. Organized labor views all law with
resentment because of the injunction, and the hostility which it has engendered
has created a political problem of proportions. The injunction is America's
distinctive contribution in the application of law to industrial strife.
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, supra note 18, at 52-53 (citations omitted).

22. BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 7 (6th ed. 1992).
23. As articulated by Frankfurter and Greene:
The injunction cannot preserve the so-called status quo; the situation does not
remain in equilibrium awaiting judgment upon full knowledge. The suspension
of activities affects only the strikers; the employer resumes his efforts to defeat
the strike, and resumes them free from interdicted interferences. Moreover, the
suspension of strike activities, even temporarily, may defeat the strike for
practical purposes and foredoom its resumption, even if the injunction is later
lifted.
FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, supra note 18, at 201.
24. WILLIAM B. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW

25. Id.
26. Id. at 25.

24 (1982).
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interpretation of the Clayton Act.27 The Clayton Act had been hailed by
labor as a "charter of freedom," partly because it seemingly curtailed
judicial involvement in labor disputes. 2'
Thus, management would look to and rely on the federal court

injunction to help prevent unions and employees from organizing

effectively. 29 The use of labor's most powerful weapon, the strike, was
many times rendered meaningless because court-ordered injunctions could
effectively thwart them. Since judicial decisions favored employers and
were regarded as highly unfair by labor sympathizers, workers acquired a
distrust of the courts. These court decisions shook labor's confidence in the
law and only further undermined labor relations between organized labor
and employers.30
As Justice Holmes predicted, it became readily apparent that labor
injunctions turned on questions of social and economic policy which were
more suitable for a legislative solution than a judicial determination.
Heeding the call, Congress attempted in 1932 to remove the federal courts
31
from most labor disputes with the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
In essence, the Norris-LaGuardia Act establishes that peaceful, concerted
activities such as strikes, boycotts, and picketing are not enjoinable.32
Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, federal courts are precluded from issuing

injunctions except where violence or fraud is involved. In addition, even
where violence or fraud is involved, an order restraining such stoppage is
available only after a hearing involving an examination and a cross
27. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
28. Cox FT AL., supra note 12, at 37; see also Duplex Printing Press Co. 254 U.S. at
443 (interpreting the Clayton Act narrowly).
29. For an example of the powerful, far-reaching impact of an easily-issued injunction,
see U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Heslop, 39 F.2d 228 (N.D. Iowa 1930). In Heslop, the court's
injunction enjoined workers from printing, publishing, issuing, circulating, and distributing,
or otherwise communicating, directly or indirectly, in writing or verbally, to any person,
association of persons, or corporation, any statement or notice of any kind or character
whatsoever, stating or representing: that there was a strike at the mill or plant of
complainant; or that the strike was still in existence; or that there was a controversy over
wages or conditions of employment between complainant and its employees; or any false
statement with reference to conditions of employment at complainant's plant. Id. at 228.
The result of this order was that workers were not allowed to tell anyone, no matter how
true, about even the existence of a strike. Congress, aware of this type of far-reaching
injunction, quickly moved to limit its future use in what would become known as the NorrisLaGuardia Act.
See The Norris-La Guardia Anti-Adjudication Act, in LABOR
ORGANIZATION 219 (Robert F. Koretz ed., 1970).
30. COXETAL., supra note 12, at 51.
31. Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1998)).
32. Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act states that no federal court shall have
"jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict conformity with the provisions
of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1998).
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33
examination, as opposed to the kind of affidavits and ex parte procedures
federal courts used prior to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Significantly, traditional equitable approaches to injunctions were also
advocated in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Section 7 of the Act, for example,
provides that a balance of harms must be undertaken by the court and
requires other procedural protections before a court may issue an
injunction.34 Section 8 of the Act, likewise, creates an equitable approach
to injunctions by providing that a complainant should not be entitled to an
injunction if he has not complied with any contract or obligation on his
part, or if he has not made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by
the available methods of arbitration or mediation.35 As stated in the debates
leading to the Act's passage, "surely this fundamental principle of equity
that he who seeks justice must do
justice should apply in labor disputes as
36
well as in judicial controversies.
Congressional action continued in 1935, when Congress enacted the
Wagner Act.37 Concerned primarily with the organizational phase of labor
relations, the Wagner Act's goal was to encourage unionization and the
development of collective bargaining.
With the aid of these two pro-labor legislative mandates, the size and
strength of unions grew in the late 1930s and 1940s. In 1940, for example,
only five million workers belonged to labor unions; by 1945 there were
nearly fifteen million union members.39 While other social and economic
factors certainly influenced union growth, the legal protections provided by
the Wagner Act, combined with Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction stance,
played a significant role in advancing the labor movement.
By the late 1940s, unions had achieved much economic power; with
that power came abuse.40 Numerous work stoppages in post-World War II

33. Although temporary ex parte orders are still allowed, they are made permissible for
a period of time not to exceed five days and only on a showing of "substantial and
irreparable injury" to the employer's property as well as through posting of a bond. 29
U.S.C. § 107 (1998); See also Celotex Corp. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union,
516 F.2d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that "substantial and irreparable injury" can justify
granting a temporary restraining order).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1998).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1998).
36. The Norris-La GuardiaAnti-Adjudication Act, supra note 29, at 236.
37. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1998)).
38. COXETAL., supra note 12, at 79.
39. STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATEs: LABOR ORGANIZATION 548 (Robert F.
Koretz ed., 1970) [hereinafter STATUTORY HISTORY] (quoting Charles Gregory).
40. Abuses by organized labor included: (1) too many strikes called under
circumstances threatening serious injury to the public health or safety; (2) some unions were
primarily used as vehicles for racketeering; (3) strikes and picketing were too often marked
by violence; (4) the secondary boycott had become a powerful weapon; and (5) a number of
unions abused closed and union shop contracts by limiting union membership to family
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America provided a scare and an illustration of the danger that strikes could
have on the American economic and social system. 41 Against this
backdrop, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act. As Archibold Cox
explained:
The Taft-Hartley Act was the product of diverse forces-the offspring, a critic might say, of an unhappy union between the
opponents of all collective bargaining and the critics of the
unions' abuses of power. The former group was probably the
most influential of the two in writing the Taft-Hartley
amendments, for organized labor's unfortunate decision
42 to oppose
all legislation left its sympathetic critics in a dilemma.
The reported goal of the Taft-Hartley Act was to put labor and
management on a level playing field. 43 Representative Fred Hartley, in his
report to the House of Representatives, explained that the necessity for
legislation was due to the industrial strife that had pushed the country to the
brink of economic paralysis. 44 It was Representative Hartley's goal to make
a fair bill that would protect not only employees, but the employers and the
public. Senator Taft opined that the administration of the NLRA had begun
to destroy the equality of bargaining power, which is necessary to maintain
industrial peace.45 In its declaration of policy, Congress stated:
It is the purpose and policy of this Act... to prescribe the
legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their
relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful
procedures for preventing the interference by either with the
legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations .... to
define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and
management which affect commerce and are inimical to the
general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in
connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.46
In this environment, Congress again decided it was necessary to
address the issue of the labor injunction. 47

members and friends and by expelling members for improper reasons, including criticizing
union officials or testifying adversely to the union in arbitration proceedings. COX ET AL.,
supra note 12, at 85-86.
41. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 39, at 548.
42. Cox ET AL., supra note 12, at 86.
43. Id.
44. H.R. REP. No. 80-245 (1947), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR

MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 294 (1974) [hereinafter LMRA].
45. S. REP. No. 80-105, at 8 (1947), reprintedin LMRA, supra note 44, at 407.
46. Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, sec. l(b), 61 Stat. 136, at 136 (1947).
47. The Taft-Hartley Act outlawed secondary boycotts, strikes to compel an employer
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11.

ENACTMENT OF SECTIONS

A.

Legislative History

10() AND 10(L)

It had been a generation since the pro-labor enactment of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, and for twelve years, the adjudication procedure of the
NLRA operated without any form of interim relief. It can be argued that
the absence of such relief reflected a deep congressional distrust of the
labor injunction, a distrust which likely stemmed from the judiciary's
abusive application of the injunction remedy before the passage of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Congress' enactment of sections 10() and 10(l)
must be 48viewed from the backdrop of considerable anti-injunction
sentiment.
But in 1947, union abuses such as secondary boycotts and violent
strikes created an environment that tempered fear of rashly issued
injunctions, especially since the use of an injunction was often necessary to
stop such abuses. Yet resuscitation of the labor injunction brought with it a
fear of the judiciary taking control once again and "abusing" its powers.
"The majority report concluded that section 10(j) would serve the dual
purposes of preserving the integrity of the Board's processes and
prohibiting a wrongdoer from benefiting from his own unfair labor
practices. ,49 The Democrats, of course, feared the judicial abuses of preNorris-LaGuardia, the result was the compromise of § 10 (j) and (1).50
Thus, the latent fear of injunctions combined with the need to stop union
abuses created a compromise strategy. Congress reasoned that only the
neutral Board could permit a court to exercise jurisdiction over labor
injunctions. To combat union abuses, Congress mandated that the Board
petition for injunctive relief in cases involving such practices as secondary
boycotts and jurisdictional disputes. For all other cases, the Board would
provide a buffer from an over-reaching judiciary by picking and choosing
the cases a district court could adjudicate. This, of course, led to the
to commit unfair labor practices, and jurisdictional strikes over work assignments. The Act
also represented an abandonment of the policy of affirmatively encouraging unionization as
illustrated by section 7 which, under Taft-Hartley, places the right to refrain from organizing
activities on equal footing with the organizing rights originally guaranteed in the NLRA.
Cox ET AL., supra note 12, at 86-87.
48. Section 10(j) was added to the NLRA by amendment on June 23, 1947, ch. 120,
Title I § 101, 61 Stat. 146 (1947).
49. Leslie A. Fahrenkopf, Note, Striking The "Justand Proper Balance": A Call For
TraditionalEquitable CriteriaFor Section IOU) Injunctions, 80 VA. L. REv. 1159, 11641165 (1994) (citing James A. Mills, Note, Section 1OU) of the NationalLaborRelationsAct:
hIcreased Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction Over Labor Disputes, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 415,
416 (1980)).
50. Id.
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necessity of having two separate and distinct provisions-sections 10(j) and
10(1). In fact, the reasoning behind Congress' enactment of sections 10()
and 10(1) differs. Section 10(1) was primarily concerned with preventing
the continuation of union abuses, while section 10() was seemingly
proposed because of the concern that parties were irreparably injured due to
lengthy Board procedures. In its most lengthy discussion on the subject of
irreparable injury, Congress explained:
Time is usually of the essence in these matters, and
consequently the relatively slow procedure of Board hearing and
order, followed many months later by an enforcing decree of the
circuit court of appeals, falls short of achieving the desired
objectives-the prompt elimination of the obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and encouragement of the practice and
procedure of free and private collective bargaining. Hence we
have provided that the Board, acting in the public interest and not
in vindication of purely private rights, may seek injunctive relief
in the case of all types of unfair labor practices and that it shall
also seek such relief in the case of strikes and boycotts defined as
unfair labor practices. 51

Experience under the National Labor Relations Act has
demonstrated that by reason of lengthy hearings and litigation
enforcing its orders, the Board has not been able in some
instances to correct unfair labor practices until after substantial
injury has been done. Since the Board's orders are not selfenforcing, it has sometimes been possible for persons violating
the act to accomplish their unlawful objective before being
placed under any legal restraint and thereby to make it impossible
or not feasible to restore or preserve the status quo pending
52
litigation.
With respect to section 10(1), Congress stated:
After a careful consideration of the evidence and proposals
before us, the committee has concluded that five specific
practices by labor organizations and their agents, affecting
commerce, should be defined as unfair labor practices. Because
of the nature of certain of these practices, especially jurisdictional
disputes, and secondary boycotts and strikes for specifically
defined objectives, the committee is convinced that additional
procedures must be made available under the National Labor
Relations Act in order adequately to protect the public welfare

51. LMRA, supra note 44, at 414.
52. Id. at 433.
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which is inextricably involved in labor disputes. 3
In fact, some senators felt that, at least with respect to unfair labor
practices under section 10(1), the Act did not go far enough and that private
litigants should be able to bring an action.5 4 There was also a fear in the
Senate that the courts would garner back the power that Congress had
previously stripped from it. For example, Senator Murray stated:
It may be anticipated that, if this section became law, the Board
would be harassed by demands that it seek immediate injunctive

relief if unfair labor practices were alleged by either employees
or employers. If such applications were made the clear result
would be to throw decision of the merits of such cases into the
Federal district courts and thus to oust the Board of jurisdiction,
since it is not to be supposed that district courts could act without
some inquiry into the merits of the dispute, or that the Board
could, at a later date, take a view of the case inconsistent with
that of the court. Mere existence of such power might prove a
handicap.55
Significantly, nowhere in the sparse legislative history of the TaftHartley Act is there any discussion as to whether a court's authority should
56
be curtailed or reshaped in any way when determining equitable relief.
Instead, the legislative debates centered on what type of actions the courts
should have jurisdiction over and whether private litigants should be able to
bring injunctions against unions. Congress was more concerned about
what type of case the judiciary should hear, rather than how the court

53. Id. at 414. Section 10()'s prohibited practices include hot cargo clauses, secondary
boycotts, coercive union organizing techniques, and coercive methods of gaining union
recognition. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(e), (b)(4)(A), (b)(4)(B), (b)(4)(C), (b)(7) (1998).
54. The Senate Report Stated:
The Board may obtain a temporary injunction from a court while it is
conducting a hearing on the question whether the strike is an unfair labor
practice or not. If it finds that it is, it then may issue a cease and desist order
against such a strike and later ask to have this enforced by the court. In our
opinion, this is a weak and uncertain remedy for those injured by clearly illegal
strikes. It depends upon the decision of the National Labor Relations Board as
to whether any action shall be taken, and the conduct of the proceedings will be
entirely in the hands of the NLRB attorneys instead of attorneys of the injured
party. The facts in such cases are easily ascertainable by any court and do not
require the expertness supposed to be one of the virtues of the administrative
law procedure.
LMRA, supra note 44, at 460.
55. Id. at 1046 (emphasis added).
56. The closest reference to a court's authority is Senator Murray's statement that "it is
not to be supposed that district courts could act without some inquiry into the merits of the
dispute, or that the Board could, at a later date, take a view of the case inconsistent with that
of the court. Mere existence of such power might prove a handicap." Id.
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should adjudicate the matter. It would appear, then, that Congress knowing
full-well the existing standards governing the issuance of equitable relief,
chose simply to direct (in the case of section 10(1)) or to permit (in the case
of section 100)) the Board to petition the federal courts for injunctive
relief. Congress left untouched, one may presume intentionally,57 the
traditional standards for equitable relief, leaving it to the federal courts to
apply such standards in the context of the disputes brought before them by
the Board as the courts deemed "just and proper."
B.

Statutory Language

Two different rationales drove the revival of the labor injunction:
preventing union abuses and preventing inequitable results from delay in
the Board processes. As a result, two distinct statutory schemes emergedsections 100) and 10(1). For all of their differences, the two sections are
also strikingly similar.58 The difference lies in the language that deals with

57. See discussion, infra pp. 23-28.
58. Section 10() provides:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in
subsection (b) of this section charging that any person has engaged in or is
engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court,
within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to
have occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such
petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and
thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or
restraining order as it deems just and proper.
29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1998).
Section 10(1) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice
within the meaning of paragraph 4(A), (B), or (C) of section 158(b) of this title,
or section 158(e) of this title or section 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary
investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all
other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to
which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney
to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge
is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board,
petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair
labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein
such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief
pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon
the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper,
notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That no
temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice unless a petition
alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be
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the Board's obligations. Designed to quickly combat union unfair labor
practice charges including hot cargo clauses, secondary boycotts, coercive
union organizing, and recognition techniques, section 10(1) is mandatory
for the Board, illustrating Congress' concerns with unions' abuse of
economic power. Section 10(1) provides that if the Board's General
Counsel has "reasonable cause to believe" that an unfair labor practice is
being committed, the General Counsel shall petition a federal district court
for interim relief. The term "reasonable cause" is found only in section
10(1) and deals only with the Board's obligation to petition a district court
for injunctive relief. In other words, if the Board has reasonable cause to
believe an unfair labor practice is occurring within the scope of section
10(1), it must seek an injunction and has no discretion in the decision to
petition for equitable relief.
In sharp distinction, section 100) gives the Board broad discretion to
decide in which cases it will seek injunctive relief. Thus, while broader in
scope than section 10(1) because it provides temporary judicial relief for
any other type of unfair labor practice charge, section 100) is discretionary
for the Board. Beyond the initial requirement that a complaint must have
been issued, there is no statutory limit or guidance as to which unfair labor
practices warrant petitioning a district court for potential injunctive relief.
Under section 10(), it is within the sole discretion of the Board to
determine which cases should be brought forth to the district court for
injunctive relief.
Although the sections are entirely different with respect to the Board's
obligations, they are identical with respect to the district court's obligation.
Both sections provide that the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such injunctive relief as the court deems "just and proper."59 There is no
language in either section that discusses the scope of judicial review or
power; rather, it is simply the unadorned standard that injunctive relief will
issue when it is found to be "just and proper., 60 Courts are offered no other
guidance from the statutory sections and are left to glean a standard for
injunctive relief from the phrase "just and proper."
It is telling that Congress either spent little or no time wondering how
courts would or should decide these cases. Perhaps Congress thought that
unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no
longer than five days and will become void at the expiration of such period.

29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1998).
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j) & (1)(1998).
60. One minor difference between sections 10(j) and 10(I) dealing with the district
court's obligation is the phrase "notwithstanding any other provision of law" found in
section 10(1). This phrase appears to reference the Norris-LaGuardia Act's provisions and is
most likely aimed at obviating any possible conflict between Norris-LaGuardia and section
10(I). Section 10(1) also provides criteria for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1998).
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procedures implemented under the Norris-LaGuardia Act were a sufficient
guide to the courts when determining whether to issue injunctive relief.
Most likely, Congress assumed that labor injunction cases should be
decided like any preliminary injunction case-using traditional equitable
notions to come to a conclusion that is just and proper. Regardless,
Congress addressed the historical fear and apprehension of labor
injunctions not in the standards used to decide injunctions, but in the court's
limited jurisdiction.
IV.

INTERPRETING SECTION 10(J)

From 1948-1961, the Board authorized an average of just three section
10() injunctions per year. 61 It is significant to note that the vast majority
of
62
section 10() injunctions during that period were sought against unions.
Speaking before the American Bar Association in 1947, the NLRB's
General Counsel Robert Denham offered insight into the Board's initial
approach:
The history of labor injunctions is too long and reveals too much
the national desire to reduce government by injunction to a
minimum to justify a theory other than that this provision is
placed in the Act for emergency purposes and only where loss or
damage or jeopardy to safety and welfare of a large segment of
the public would result if injunctive action were not taken.63
In 1962, however, Congress concluded that the Board's failure to
utilize section 10(j) discretionary injunctions often resulted in irreparable
injury. But while NLRB Chairman McCulloch announced that the Board
would seek more section 10(j) injunctions, he nevertheless reemphasized a
fear of labor injunctions when he observed that "the extraordinary remedy
of injunction should not and cannot become the ordinary remedy in unfair
labor practice cases."64
61. Figures compiled from 13 NLRB ANN. REP. (1948) to 26 NLRB ANN. REP. (1961).
62. Id. Perhaps the Board, heeding congressional concern about union abuses, focused
its early efforts on union activity. This emphasis has been completely reversed, where today
nearly every section 10(0) injunction is filed against an employer. For example, in 1997, the
Board filed a total of 35 petitions for temporary relief under section 10(j). All the petitions
filed were against employers. 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 73 (1997).
63. Fahrenkopf, supra note 49, at 1168 (citing I. HERBERT ROTHENBERG, ROTHENBERG
ON LABOR RELATIONS 632 n.4 (1949)).
64. Bruce W. Burns, Comment, Section lO(j) of the National Labor Relations Act: A
Legislative, Administrative and JudicialLook at a Potentially Effective (But Seldom Used)
Remedy, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1021, 1035 (1978) (citing Frank W. McCulloch, New
Problems in the Administration of the Labor-ManagementRelations Act: The Taft-Hartley
Injunction, 16 Sw. L.J. 82, 97 (1962)).
Chairman McCulloch's concern seemingly stemmed from the fact that the more
detailed analysis a court undertakes, the more power potentially is taken away from the
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With the imminent expansion of section 10(j) injunctions, it was
imperative that the courts develop consistent standards to be used in
adjudicating this extraordinary remedy. Unfortunately, this proved not to
be the case.
A.

Early Case Law

Courts were slow to develop standards with regard to section 10(j) and
section 10(1) injunctions. This, coupled with the lack of opportunity to
develop a clear set of standards, led to confusion and uncertainty. One
commentator described the attitude of the courts in the 1940s, 1950s, and
1960s as follows:
Some courts have apparently assumed that given reasonable
cause to believe a violation has been committed the issue is not
open to judicial question. Others have explicitly stated that the
court must defer to administrative judgment. Most of the cases
which pass beyond the previous two situations nevertheless
mechanically apply the statute to the facts. In many of the cases
in which the issue of proper standards has been raised, and
discussed, the need for an injunction was so clear by any standard
that no incisive analysis was needed for the holding; and the
cases are easily restricted to their facts.
In the few cases in which the requested injunction has been
denied, the grounds for denial were almost always that the Board
failed to show reasonable cause to believe a violation had been
committed. The question of standards was never approached. In
the very few instances in which an injunction has been denied for
lack of need for that injunction, the court has failed to handle the
problem in a clear and helpful fashion. 65
Interestingly, two early district court cases from New York, decided
just one month apart, seem to have set the trend for the divergence of
opinions as to the section 10(j) standard that continues to plague the courts
to this day. In Douds v. Local 294 International Brotherhood of

Board. While the district court decision would not be binding, it could prove instructive and
perhaps persuasive to an administrative law judge, the Board, or more likely, to a court of
appeals. The existence of a prior determination would possibly unduly influence subsequent
Board decisions or appeals, and therefore result in an expansion of the court's power in
contravention of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Thus, it has been argued that injunctions should
only be used in the most extraordinary of situations so as to allow the Board to retain power.
See Comment, Temporary Injunctions Under Section 10() of the Taft-Hartley Act, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 182 (1969).
65. Recent Developments, The 10() Labor Injunction: An Exercise in Statutory
Construction, 42 WASH. L. REV. 1117, 1121-22 (1967) (citations omitted).
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Teamsters,66 the Board brought both section 10() and section 10(1) actions
against the union for a litany of alleged unfair labor practices. While the
court focused on the "just and proper" language of both statutes and held
that both statutes should be treated identically when determining the
propriety of relief, the court rejected the notion that irreparable injury
and/or no adequate remedy at law must be shown before the petitioner
could be granted relief.67 The court reasoned that since section 10(j) relief
is entirely statutory, common law requirements should not apply. Instead,
the court concluded that interlocutory relief under section 10() may be
granted upon a showing of "reasonable probability" that the moving party
is entitled to final relief. 68 Explaining what it meant by a "reasonable
probability," the court observed that, "[t]he requirements.., are met when
the factual jurisdictional requirements are shown, and credible evidence is
presented which, if uncontradicted, would warrant the granting of the
requested relief, having in mind the purpose of the statute and interests
involved in its enforcement." 69
In Douds v. Wine Liquor & Distillery Workers Local 1,70 the district
court, deciding a section 10(1) petition, emphasized the need for judicial
discretion in determining what is just and proper relief, citing the long
history of courts' experience with equity practice.7 ' The court denied the
injunction, in part, because there was no likelihood of irreparable injury to
the flow of interstate commerce, to the general welfare, to the charging
parties, or to anyone else.72 The court held that traditional equitable criteria
must be satisfied and further stated that "unless a petition alleges that
substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable,
[equitable criteria] should serve as a guide and norm7 to3 the court when
interpreting and applying what it deems just and proper.
These decisions illustrate the basic split in standards governing section
100) injunctions: one, more deferential to the Board, disregarding the
traditional equitable standards; the other, in sharp contrast, embracing the
experience and approach of the courts' long-established equity practice.
Apart from the incipient split in approaches, the most troubling matter
66. 75 F. Supp. 414 (N.D.N.Y. 1947).
67. Id. at 418.
68. Id.
69. Id. Although apparently intended to be deferential to the Board, the court's
"reasonable probability" standard at least sounds like the traditional equitable factor of
"likelihood of success on the merits." Any similarity is dispelled entirely, though, by the
court's explanation of that phrase.
70. 75 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
71. Id. at 186; see also Lebaron v. Kern County Farm Labor Union, 80 F. Supp. 151
(S.D. Cal. 1948) (holding that in a section 10(1) action, the general equity powers of the
court are not abrogated).
72. Douds,75 F. Supp. at 188.
73. Id.
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surrounding early interpretations of section 10() was the courts'
unexplained grafting of the "reasonable cause" language found in section
10(1) into section 100) cases. Nowhere in section 10(j) does the term
"reasonable cause" appear. In Douds v. International Longshoreman
Ass'n,74 the Second Circuit brought the blurring of the statutes a step further
by holding that "[s]ection 10() specifically provided for a temporary
injunction on petition by the Board when there is reasonable cause to
believe the unfair labor practice complained of was committed." 75 As use
of the section 10() injunction increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the "reasonable cause" criteria established a foothold in the section 10(j)
analysis.76
Through this unexplained merging of section 10(j) and section 10(1), a
loose standard began to develop for section 10(j) injunctions, along with an
extreme deference to the Board in the proceedings. As one commentator
stated, "[i]njunctions were almost always issued upon request, either
because the judiciary deferred to the Board's judgment or because the need
for relief 'was so clear by any standard' that no incisive analysis was needed
for the holding."01 With this deference came the implicit rejection of a
traditional equitable component to the injunctive relief analysis. The result
was a two-prong approach from the courts
to determine the appropriateness
78
of injunctive relief under section 100).
B.

Modem Approaches
Generally, until the late 1980s, the courts agreed on the use of a two-

74. 241 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1957).
75. Id. at 285 (emphasis added); see also Johnston v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 341 F.2d 891,
892 (4th Cir. 1965) (stating that 10(j) injunctions should be based on a finding by the district
court that there is "reasonable cause to believe that unfair labor practices ha[ve] been
committed and that [under the existing circumstances] injunctive relief is just and proper").
76. See Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 479 F.2d 778, 787 (5th Cir. 1973) (showing
of reasonable cause is necessary for the issuance of a temporary injunction); Angle v. Sacks,
382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967) (finding of reasonable cause is an implicit prerequisite for
relief); Johnston, 341 F.2d at 892; McLeod v. Compressed Air Workers, 292 F.2d 358, 361
(2d Cir. 1961) (finding of reasonable cause is a prerequisite to the granting of injunctive
relief).
77. Fahrenkopf, supra note 49, at 1169.
78. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967); McLeod
v. General Elec. Co., 366 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated, 385 U.S. 533 (1967)
(memorandum of Justice Harlan). Justice Harlan granted the Board's application for a stay,
pending certiorari proceedings, of a judgement of the Second Circuit setting aside a
temporary injunction issued by a district court. In granting the stay, Justice Harlan pointed
out that the standards governing the application of section 10() had never been decided by
the Supreme Court, despite the section's continuing importance in the proper administration
of the NLRA. See also Kobell v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs. Inc., 142 F.3d 428 (3d
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1121 (1999).
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prong approach to determine the appropriateness of injunctive relief,
regardless of whether the injunction was sought under section 10(j) or
section 10(1). That approach consists of two separate inquiries. The first
inquiry is whether the Board has established reasonable cause to believe
that an unfair labor practice has occurred. The second inquiry is whether
the requested relief is "just and proper".
It is not an exaggeration to assert that the "reasonable cause" test is
generally a non-factor for all the circuits. The test of "reasonable cause"
has developed into an extremely low threshold for the Board to meet.
"Reasonable cause" is generally satisfied by a simple showing that the
Board's legal theories are not insubstantial or frivolous.79 The extreme
deference given to the Board is at the core of this test. For example, courts
have recognized that they are not to weigh all the evidence presented, but
rather should give the Board's version of the facts "the benefit of the
doubt."8 ° As noted by the Sixth Circuit, the question as to whether the
NLRA has been violated ultimately "is a function reserved exclusively to
the NLRB.""

This test makes it highly unlikely that a party could argue that
reasonable cause is not established.

In fact, due to Board processes for

79. For example, the Third Circuit had divided the reasonable prong analysis into a two
step inquiry. This analysis requires a district court to first determine whether the legal
theory that underlies the Board's unfair labor practice allegation is substantial and not
frivolous. Then the district court must determine whether the Board has demonstrated
sufficient facts which, if true, would support an unfair labor practice finding under the legal
theory presented, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Board, without
resolving credibility issues that may be raised by the evidence. Kobell v. Suburban Lines,
731 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1985); see also Calatrello v. "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 55
F.3d 208, 212 (6th Cir. 1995) (discussing the idea that the director only has to come up with
some evidence to support his position and that he does not have to convince the court of the
validity of the Board's theory as long as the theory is not frivolous); Arlook v. S.
Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 371 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Board must present enough
evidence in support of its coherent theory to permit a rational factfinder... to rule in favor
of the Board."); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1975)
(determining that all that is necessary for reasonable cause is that the "Board's theories of
law and fact are not insubstantial or frivolous"); Hirsch v. Corban Corps., 949 F. Supp. 296,
299 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that the court must find that the theory of the Board is
substantial).
80. Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat Garment Workers' Union, 494 F.2d 1230, 1244 (2d
Cir. 1974) (finding that although the district court's "duty of scrutiny" is not limited to
determining whether the regional director's claim is "insubstantial and frivolous,"
nonetheless, "on an issue of law, the district court should be hospitable to the views of the
General Counsel, however novel"); see also Silverman v. Major League Baseball, 880 F.
Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
81. Calatrello,55 F.3d at 212-13; see also Asseo v. Centro Medico Del Turabo, Inc.,
900 F.2d 445, 450 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that "the district court is not empowered to decide
the merits of the case, that is, whether an unfair labor practice occurred"); Kaynard v. Mego
Corp., 633 F.2d 1026, 1033 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding of reasonable cause must ensue unless
the district court is convinced that the legal position of the Board is wrong).
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bringing section 10(j) injunctions8 2 and issuing complaints"--a prerequisite
for a section 10(j) injunction-it is almost incomprehensible that the
"neutral" Board would petition for an injunction in a case where it could
not establish that there was reasonable cause to believe unfair labor
practices were being committed, or, for that matter, that the Board could
not establish a legal theory that was not frivolous. While the terms used to
describe "reasonable cause" differ among the courts, 84 the bottom line
remains the same--the first prong of the test is simply a mere rubber stamp
for the Board. As such, it is useless as a measure to decide the question of
whether injunctive relief is warranted.
A more significant lack of consensus has developed among the courts
with respect to the second prong-the meaning and definition of what is
"just and proper". Relying on the sparse legislative history,85 courts have
emphasized the need for the parties to be restored to the status quo.
Generally, injunctive relief has been deemed just and proper where it
results in the preservation of the status quo pending the issuance of a final
Board order or the completion of litigation in the courts.8 6 While the
objective of the "status quo" may be somewhat clear, determining which
cases warrant preservation of the status quo has proven difficult.

82. A complaint must first be filed, then the regional director makes a recommendation
to the General Counsel's Office, through the Division of Advice, which, in turn, makes a
recommendation to the Board. No section 10(j) proceedings may be instituted unless
authorized by the Board. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD SECTION 10(J) MANUAL, App. A at 16 (May 1994).
83. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CASE HANDLING MANUAL, PART I, §§
10252-58 (pre-complaint action) and § 10108 (written or oral report regarding issuance of
complaint). Section 10108 provides that a written or oral report recommending issuance of
a complaint should be prepared by the Board agent responsible for the case. The report
should include such things as a factual chronology, which may also include credibility
considerations, conclusions, recommendations, discussion of an appropriate remedy, and
legal analysis if necessary. Given this substantial pre-complaint investigation, analysis, and
report, it is very unlikely a Board's complaint could not satisfy the current reasonable cause
prong.
84. See, e.g., Fleischut v. Nixon Detroit Diesel Inc., 859 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1988)
(finding that the Board needs only some evidence and that the district court should not
resolve conflicts if facts could support the legal theory); Eisenberg v. Lenape Prods. Inc.,
781 F.2d 999, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986) (viewing facts in light most favorable to the Board);
Kaynard v. Palby Lingerie Inc., 625 F.2d 1047, 1051 (2d Cir. 1980) (giving the benefit of
the doubt to the Board on factual disputes); Kaynard, 633 F.2d at 1031 (sustaining Board's
version of the facts if rational and drawing inferences in favor of Board).
85. See Fahrenkopf, supra note 49, at 1159.
86. See Johnston v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 341 F.2d 891, 892 (4th Cir. 1965). Courts tend
not to agree on the definition of the "status quo" in this context. See Seeler v. Trading Port,
Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that status quo is the situation that existed before
the onset of unfair labor practices); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 479 F.2d 778, 788
(5th Cir. 1973) (finding that status quo is the last uncontested status which preceded the
pending controversy); see also Bums, supra note 64, at 1043-44.
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While a variety of approaches have been articulated, 87 two general
approaches have emerged to interpret section 10(j)'s "just and proper"
language. One approach emphasizes that an injunction is just and proper if
it will prevent frustration of the remedial purposes of the Act. The other
approach contemplates the use of the traditional equitable criteria used in
determining the propriety of injunctive relief in other forums: namely,
balancing of the hardships, likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable
harm, and the public interest."
The "frustration of the Act," standard is by far the more lenient of the
two "theories," and historically the more commonly used.89 It requires only
that the NLRB show a need for interim relief "to prevent frustration of the
remedial purposes of the Act," and to preserve the Board's ultimate
remedial powers.90 In sum, this standard looks only to whether the
injunction is necessary for the Board to complete its job. 9' Significantly,
the equitable bedrock factor of a showing of irreparable harm is generally
not a factor to be considered under this approach.92 As one commentator
notes, there is little guidance behind the words "just and proper. 9 3 For,
under a broad interpretation of this standard, every unfair labor practice
case that is not immediately settled frustrates the purpose of the NLRA.9 4
In short, while the traditional approach, as discussed more fully later,

87. For example, the extraordinary circumstances standard was meant to be reserved for
serious and extraordinary situations where the unfair labor practices, unless contained,
would have an adverse and deleterious effect on the rights of the aggrieved party.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1967). The public
interest standard requires that the labor dispute impact the public interest. Courts applying
this standard generally grant relief only if the denial would have a widespread, substantial,
and damaging effect on the public interest or would cause widespread economic dislocation.
Squillacote v. UAW Local 578, 384 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Wis. 1974); McCleod v.
Compressed Air Workers Local 147, 194 F. Supp. 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 292 F.2d 358
(2d Cir. 1961); see also Fahrenkopf, supranote 49, at 1172-73.
88. See Robert M. Dell, Note, The Use of Section IO(j) of the Labor-Management
RelationsAct in Employer Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 845, 854.
89. Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 660-61 (10th Cir. 1967); Sachs v. Davis & Hemphill,
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 142, 148 (D. Md. 1969).
90. Arlook v. S. Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367 (11th Cir. 1992); Fleischut v. Nixon
Detroit Diesel, Inc., 859 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1988); Eisenberg v. Lenape Prods., Inc., 781 F.2d
999 (3d Cir. 1986); Kobell v. Suburban Lines, 731 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1984); Kobell v.
United Refining Co., 159 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2762 (W.D. Pa. 1998); Schaub v. Detroit
Newspaper Agency, 984 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1997), affd, 154 F.3d 276, 279 (6th Cir.
1998) (finding however, that a court may consider equitable factors, including delay in
petitioning the court).
91. Fahrenkopf, supra note 49, at 1177.
92. Calatrello v. "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 55 F.3d 208, 214 (6th Cir.'1995);
D'Amico v. Townsend Culinary Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D. Md. 1998) (citing NLRB v.
Aerovox Corp., 389 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1967)).
93. Bums, supra note 64, at 1044.
94. Id. at 1048.
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allows for broader judicial discretion, the "frustration" standard seems to
encourage deference to administrative
findings, establishing a presumption
95
in favor of granting injunctive relief.
Under the two-prong approach, courts created a myriad of standards
and tests designed to provide the Board deference and to determine whether
to grant injunctive relief. It wasn't until 1989 that a federal court of appeals
thoroughly and critically analyzed the statutory language and legislative
history behind section 10(j) and attempted to articulate an approach that
would sensibly clarify the standards courts should consider when
determining the propriety of relief under section 100).
•

C.

96

Kinney v. PioneerPress

In 1989, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion authored
by Judge Easterbrook, undertook a detailed analysis of the section 10(j)
injunction process and concluded that the favored two-prong approach was
not the appropriate standard for courts to use when determining the
propriety of injunctive relief.
Pioneer Press, a publisher of suburban Chicago newspapers, withdrew
recognition from the union representing its production workers, contending
it had a good faith doubt as to whether a majority of the workers still
supported the union. The withdrawal of recognition occurred during
negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement. Once it withdrew
recognition, the company refused to bargain with the union, unilaterally
implemented a wage increase, removed union literature from bulletin
boards, and warned all employees against distributing union literature. The
Board's General Counsel issued a complaint against Pioneer Press, alleging
violations of section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5).97 Concerned that the union might

95. See Arlook, 952 F.2d at 372 (finding injunctive relief under section 10(j) just and
proper whenever the facts demonstrate that without such relief, "any final order of the Board
will be meaningless or so devoid of force that the remedial purposes of the Act will be
frustrated"); Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655, 660 (stating that when the circumstances of a
case create a reasonable apprehension that the efficacy of the Board's final order may be
nullified, or the administrative procedures will be rendered meaningless, injunctive relief
should be issued); see also Pascarell v. Vibra Screw Inc., 904 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 1990)
(determining whether the failure to grant injunctive relief would be likely to prevent the
Board from effectively exercising its remedial powers); Fleischut, 859 F.2d at 30 (finding
that the district court must inquire whether the relief is necessary to preserve the remedial
power of the Board).
96. 881 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1989).
97. Section 8(a)(1) provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights" under the chapter.
Section 8(a)(3) provides, in part, that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer...
[to discriminate] in any term or condition of employment or discourage membership in any
labor organization". Section 8(a)(5) provides that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
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wither during the pendency of the Board's proceedings, the Board
petitioned the district court under section 100) for injunctive relief.
Applying the two-prong approach, the district court held that injunctive
relief was not warranted. 98
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded
the district court decision. Focusing on the statutory language of sections
10(j) and 10(1), the court of appeals rejected the proposition that the
existence of "reasonable cause" should play any part in the section 10(j)
analysis, emphasizing that the two sections operate differently. The court
explained:
"Reasonable cause" is the trigger of the Board's duty under §
10(1). Because § 10(1) is mandatory, Congress had to establish
the boundary of the Board's obligation .... "Reasonable cause"
under § 10(1) thus serves two functions: it requires the Board to
investigate before filing suit, and it allows the Board to filter out
claims of violations that do not justify litigation.
Section 10(j) has a different structure. This law never requires
the Board to sue, and the Board may act on its own schedule ....
Having given the Board unfettered discretion not to sue under §
10(j), Congress did not need the threshold that 'reasonable cause'
represents under § 10(l). 99
Not only did the Pioneer Press court take issue with courts that had
been treating the two sections with distinct functions and texts as identical,
it concluded that the "reasonable cause" inquiry was basically rendered
meaningless if a court, interpreting the "just and proper" language,
undertook an analysis under the traditional equitable approach with its
likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits component. The court observed in that
regard:
When courts apply traditional equitable principles to inquire
whether an injunction is "just and proper" under § 10(), no
further purpose is served by asking the district judge, as a
preliminary matter, to determine whether the Director has
established reasonable cause. To the extent it is important, the
inquiry is part of the analysis of whether injunctive relief is just
and proper ....
The two questions, we have noted, "tend[] to
merge." If the General Counsel's legal theory is inapt or if the
facts are stacked against the agency's position (i.e., if there is
truly no reasonable cause to believe someone has breached the
NLRA), it's a safe bet that injunctive relief is not "just and
employer.., to refuse to bargain collectively with a representative of his employees." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1998).
98. PioneerPress, 881 F.2d at 488.
99. Id. at 489.
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proper." In fact, the district judge would be required to deny
relief under such circumstances, because an injunction may not
issue unless the plaintiff has at least a modest chance of success
on the merits. Because the district judge must consider the
strength of the Director's case in order to make this decision,
nothing is gained by engrafting onto § 10(j) proceedings a
preliminary "reasonable cause" test.' °°
Thus, the court held that it could only engage in an interpretation of
whether an injunction would be just and proper. The standard to be
considered when interpreting whether injunctive relief is just and proper is
the traditional standard applied to injunction cases in other settings. As
such, failure to establish irreparable injury and likelihood of success on the
merits dooms any request for injunctive relief under section 10(j).' 0 '
D. Miller v. CaliforniaPacific Medical Center 0 2
Expanding on the PioneerPress analysis, the Ninth Circuit in Miller
v. California Pacific Medical Center developed a similar, yet different,
analysis of the section 10(j) injunction. 10 3 Where PioneerPress interpreted
"just and proper" as a call for traditional equitable criteria, California
Pacific combined the historical viewpoint of the "just and proper" analysis
with the traditional equitable analysis favored in PioneerPress.
In 1994, the NLRB sought a section 10(j) injunction to restore nurses
employed by Children's Hospital of San Francisco to the union-represented
collective bargaining status they held before the hospital merged with nonunion Pacific Presbyterian Medical Center. The district court, applying the
two-prong test, granted the Board's petition for an injunction. The Ninth
Circuit reversed.' 4
In reversing, the California Pacific court created a new formula for
district courts to use when adjudicating section 10(j) cases. Like Pioneer
Press, the new test eliminates the "reasonable cause" prong, calling it
confusing because it made the court focus on the preliminary investigation
instead of the likelihood of success on the merits.0 5 While positing that

100. Id. at 491 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Seventh Circuit also concluded
that it could be reasonably inferred that the Board has established reasonable cause if it
petitions for an injunction, stating that "[ujnless acting capriciously, the General Counsel
would establish something like 'reasonable cause' as the threshold for filing an
administrative complaint." Id. at 490 n.2.
101. Id. at494.
102. 19 F.3d 449 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
103. Id.
104. Id. at461.
105. Id. at457.
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"just and proper" is another way of saying appropriate or equitable,'06 the
Ninth Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit in Pioneer Press, fused the two
prevalent interpretations of the "just and proper" prong into a single query.
Under the CaliforniaPacific analysis, a court applies traditional equitable
criteria to determine whether failure to grant an injunction would frustrate
the remedial purposes of the NLRA. The court explained its rationale:
We therefore hold that in determining whether interim relief
under § 10(j) is "just and proper," district courts should consider
traditional equitable criteria. They must do so, however, through
the prism of the underlying purpose of § 10(j), which is to protect
the integrity of the collective bargaining process and to preserve
the Board's remedial power while it processes the charge.
What the "prism" means is somewhat unclear, although in explaining
its rationale the court observed that "it is necessary to factor in the district
court's lack of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices, and the deference
accorded to NLRB determinations by the courts of appeals."'0' Thus, the
court emphasized that deference to the NLRB is still necessary when
analyzing what is just and proper, even when applying traditional equitable
criteria.
E. Sharp v. Parentsin Community Action, Inc.10 9
The latest entrant to the section 10(j) field is the Eighth Circuit, which
rejected the Board's argument that a showing of "likelihood of success on
the merits gives too little deference to the agency's interpretation of the
facts and the inferences to be drawn from such facts."110 In Sharp v.
Parentsin Community Action, Inc., the Eighth Circuit held, and the Board
even concedes, that section 10(j)'s reference to "just and proper"
incorporates traditional equitable principles."' However, in the Board's
view, "requiring it to show a likelihood of success on the merits [gave] too
little deference to the agency's interpretation[s] of the facts and the
inferences to be drawn from [such] facts. 1 2 Rejecting the Board's
recommendation to keep the "reasonable cause" analysis, the 3court
emphasizes the inherent flexibility in traditional equitable principles.1
The court states that the basis for injunctive relief is irreparable harm

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 458.
Id. at 459-460.
Id. at 460 (citing NLRB v. City Disposal Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 829 (1984)).
172 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and inadequacy of legal remedies.1 4 However, in determining the
propriety of relief under section 10(j), the Eighth Circuit interprets the
irreparable harm to be addressed as the harm to the collective bargaining
process or to other protected employee activities if a remedy must await the
Board's full adjudicatory process.1 5 The court concludes by reciting
Eighth Circuit precedent, holding that "the question in each case is whether
the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction is 'necessary either to
preserve the status quo or to prevent frustration of the basic remedial
purpose of the Act.""' 6 The court then announced the Eighth Circuit
standard:
In deciding whether a § 10(j) injunction would be "just and
proper" under traditional equitable principles, . . .the inquiry
should focus initially on the question of irreparable injurywhether the Board has satisfied the court that the case presents
one of those rare situations in which the delay inherent in
completing the adjudicatory process will frustrate the Board's
ability to remedy the alleged unfair labor practices. If the Board
clears that relatively high hurdle, the court must then balance any
competing irreparable injury to respondent, and it must consider
likelihood of success on the merits, examining that factor, not in
isolation, but "in the context of the relative injuries to the parties
and the public." The purpose of this inquiry into the merits is not
to second guess the Board's decision to commence enforcement
proceedings. Rather, likelihood of success is relevant to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction "because the need for the
court to act is, at least,
in part, a function of the validity of the
117
applicant's claim."

While CaliforniaPacific emphasizes the need to consider traditional
equitable criteria in the context of "preventing frustration of the remedial
purposes of the Act,"'1 8 Sharp takes this prism analysis a step further by
positing that considering whether the remedial purposes of the Act have
114. The Eighth Circuit's standard test for preliminary injunctions is:
1. The threat of irreparable harm to the movant;
2. The balance between the harm to the movant and the harm to other parties if
the injunction is granted;
3. The movant's probability of success on the merits; and
4. The public interest.
Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys. Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1977).
115. Sharp, 172 F.3d at 1038.
116. Id. at 1039 (quoting Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270
(8th Cir. 1967)).
117. Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id.
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been frustrated should be engaged in only when analyzing the irreparable
harm component of the traditional test.119
F.

PresentStandards

At present, the state of the law is fractured and confused as to when an
injunction should be issued under section 100). The First and Second
Circuits have begun to champion the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit's
more or less traditional approach to the "just and proper" inquiry, but have
kept the "reasonable cause" prong intact.1 20 The Seventh, Eighth, and
Ninth Circuits have not engaged in that preliminary inquiry. A number of
circuits continue to stubbornly hold to the two-prong test.121 Furthermore,
both a district court of the District of Columbia and a district court of
Maryland have applied a traditional equitable test. 122
A legal practitioner faced with defending a client against a petition for
injunctive relief is faced with differing obligations depending on the circuit
and even the particular judge. From the deference given to the Board, to
the definition of "just and proper," to the burden of defending against a
showing of "reasonable cause," to understanding what is truly meant by
using the traditional equitable approach, the practitioner, even after
researching the law of a particular circuit, is faced with a daunting task.
Even with respect to the Pioneer PresslCaliforniaPacific analysis,
there are minor nuances and interpretations which make it difficult to pin
down exactly what needs to be proven to establish or defend against the
need for interlocutory relief. For example, in CaliforniaPacific, the court
held that irreparable injury will be assumed if the respondent admits the
substance of the unfair labor practice charge or if the Board demonstrates
119. Id.
120. The First Circuit returned to the reasonable cause analysis, even though it realized
the futility in retaining a reasonable cause requirement when a court must assess the
likelihood of success component under the just and proper analysis. Pye v. Sullivan
Brothers Printers, Inc., 38 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that without a clear likelihood of
success, injunctive relief is not just and proper, and that the sine qua non of the injunctive
relief analysis is whether the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits); see also Kaynard
v. Mego Corp., 633 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1980).
121. For example, in the 1997 case of Schaub v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 984 F.
Supp. 1048, 1052 (E.D. Mich. 1997), affd, 154 F.3d 276 (6th Cir. 1998), a district court
followed the Sixth Circuit precedent of the two-prong approach, stating that the Sixth
Circuit's just and proper analysis of "frustration of the remedial purposes of the Act" gives
the court a narrower scope of discretion. Many circuit courts have made similar findings.
See generally Dowd v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO, 975 F.2d 779 (11th Cir.
1992); Gottfried v. Frankel, 818 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1987); Kobell v. Suburban Lines Inc.,
731 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1984); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir.
1975); Angle v. Sacks, 382 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1967).
122. D'Amico v. Townsend Culinary, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D. Md. 1998); D'Amico
v. U.S. Serv. Indus., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1075 (D.D.C. 1994).
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that it is likely to prevail on the merits.'2' However, if the charge is
contested or the Board has only a fair chance of success on the merits, the
court must evaluate the potential irreparable injury.124
Equally troubling is the Seventh Circuit's alteration of its traditional
approach. In NLRB v. Electro-Voice, Inc.,"25 the Seventh Circuit, while
applying equitable criteria, emphasized that its underlying task is to
determine whether harm to organizational efforts is so great as to permit
persons violating the Act to accomplish their unlawful objectives,
rendering the Board's remedial powers ineffectual. 126 And while the
NLRB's Regional Director is not entitled to prevail simply because she
brings a complaint, the court held that once the Director presents evidence
sufficient to tip the scales in her favor, nothing more is required. 2 7 In
addition, the court stated that no rule of law limits injunctive relief to
serious and extraordinary circumstances.12 Similar to California Pacific,
this language suggests less of an emphasis on balancing of the harms or a
likelihood of success component and more emphasis on providing
deference to the Board. In fact, a recent district court case in the Seventh
Circuit cites CaliforniaPacific'sprism analysis with approval. 129
123. Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 459 (9th Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 459-60 (explaining that "[iln statutory enforcement cases where the
government has met the 'probability of success' prong.., we presume it has met the
'possibility of irreparable injury' prong because the passage of the statute is itself an implied
finding by Congress that violations will harm the public. Therefore, further inquiry into
irreparable injury is unnecessary.") (quoting United States v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., 982 F.2d
394 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Overstreet v. Thomas Davis Med. Ctr., P.C., 9 F. Supp. 2d
1162 (D. Ariz. 1997).
125. 83 F.3d 1559 (7th Cir. 1996).
126. Id. at 1567.
127. Id. at 1567-68.
128. Id. (citing Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485, 493 (7th Cir. 1989)). Courts,
however, have continuously held that section 10(j) relief is an extraordinary remedy.
Kinney v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 994 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is an
extraordinary tool because it injects the legal system into disputes before a full airing of the
facts and a careful consideration of the law, and mistakes can be costly."); Arlook v. S.
Lichtenberg & Co., 952 F.2d 367, 374 (11th Cir. 1992); Kobell v. Suburban Lines, Inc., 731
F.2d 1076, 1091 n.26 (3d Cir. 1984); Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185,
1192 (5th Cir. 1975); Clark v. Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc., No 4:94 CV 00308, 1994 WL
1027520, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 25, 1994).
129. Lineback v. Printpack Inc., 979 F. Supp. 831, 847 (S.D. Ind. 1997). Other
traditional equitable factors are also analyzed with different interpretations. For example,
the public interest factor has been met with a variety of approaches. In the district court
case of Sharp v. Tri-State Mechanical, Inc., No. 95-C-0392, 1995 WL 661101 (W.D. Wis.
Aug. 25, 1995), the court, using the PioneerPress approach, concluded that the traditional
equitable public interest factor is non-dispositive. The public, the court reasoned, has an
equal interest in deterring illegitimate efforts to inhibit labor organizing and protecting
employers from the imposition of sanctions based on unfounded charges of unfair labor
practices. Id. at *4. Yet in Electro-Voice, the Seventh Circuit defined public interest as
"harm to the public interest stemming from the injunction that is tolerable in light of the
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With different approaches undertaken by courts, the potential for
forum shopping by the NLRB is apparent. According to section 10(j), the
Board may bring an action against a party in any district court where the
unfair labor practice occurred or where the party resides or transacts
business.13 ° There has been no evidence uncovered that would indicate that
the NLRB is currently engaging in this type of practice. However, as the
circuit courts continue to split further apart, especially as to the deference
afforded to the Board or whether "reasonable cause" continues to be part of
the analysis, the temptation to forum shop will increase.
Not only is forum shopping an unfortunate risk of the multitude of
legal standards, but inconsistent evidentiary standards and pre-hearing
procedures, notably discovery, will continue to plague the section 10(j)
proceedings. It is fundamental to note that if discovery is permitted in
il be shaped and limited by the
future section 10(j) proceedings, 131 it will
nature of the hearing and the respective burdens of proof that must be met
by each party to the section 10(j) proceedings. If, for example, irreparable
harm or success on the merits, as defined by traditional notions of equitable
relief, must be shown, then the courts will allow the parties to engage in
discovery to prove or to disprove those elements. 11322 If, on the other hand,
the inquiry is simply the exceedingly deferential two-prong standard, courts
may be tempted to limit discovery, believing the issues to be limited to
reasonable cause to believe an unfair labor practice exists and the
frustration of the bargaining process. 33

benefits achieved by the relief. In other words, when examining whether an injunction is in
the public interest, a court must weigh the potential public benefits against the potential
public costs." Electro-Voice, 83 F.3d at 1573-74 (citation omitted). Also, the Seventh
Circuit held that there is a public interest in preventing the frustration of the remedial
purposes of the Act. Id. at 1574. In CaliforniaPacific,the public interest factor considers
whether an unfair labor practice will succeed because the Board takes too long to investigate
and adjudicate the charge. California Pacific, 19 F.3d at 460. How this differs from a
consideration of irreparable injury is uncertain, See Lineback, 979 F. Supp. at 847 (holding
that the director need not show harm to third parties to meet public interest test).
130. See Fahrenkopf, supranote 49, at 1159 n.3.
131. Courts inconsistently have permitted discovery in section 10(j) proceedings.
Compare NLRB v. Modem Drop Forge Co., No. 96 C 5573, 1997 WL 120572 (7th Cir.
Mar. 14, 1997) (ordering NLRB Regional Director to give deposition testimony) and Dial
Info. Serv. v. Thomburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991) (allowing respondent to take
expedited discovery in preliminary injunction request) with Gottfried v. Frankel, 818 F.2d
485, 493 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding hearing transcripts, affidavits, and exhibits sufficient) and
Johnston v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 341 F.2d 891, 892 (4th Cir. 1965) (affirming district court's
decision to try case on affidavits alone).
132. See NLRB v. Modem Drop Forge Co., No. 96 C 5573, 1997 WL 120572 (7th Cir.
Mar. 14, 1997).
133. See Dunbar v. Landis Plastics, Inc., No. 98-6042, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15112, at
*3-*4 (2d Cir. June 10, 1998); see also infra note 148.
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A CALL FOR A SIMPLER APPROACH

A CALL FOR A SIMPLE APPROACH: (HISTORICAL FEAR OF LABOR
INJUNCTIONS SHOULD NOT NECESSITATE DIFFERENT PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION STANDARDS)

As stated previously, courts even disagree about how to apply
traditional equitable criteria to the "just and proper" analysis. As illustrated
in California Pacific, Electro-Voice, and Sharp, courts have struggled to
harmonize the traditional equitable criteria with the historical deference
given to the Board found in the two-prong approach. This struggle, and the
resulting complexity, is unnecessary because traditional equitable criteria,
in and of themselves, provide the protection and the guidance necessary to
adjudicate labor injunctions under section 10().
A.

The PreliminaryInjunction

Necessarily, the granting of preliminary injunctive relief requires an
adjustment of the rights of the parties without a full adjudication of the
facts. When dealing with non-section 10(j) or section 10(1) injunctions,
federal courts have consistently and uniformly considered any and all
relevant factors carefully before granting or denying such relief. No single
factor is dispositive or dispensable. Moreover, the fact that all of the circuit
courts have arrived at substantially the same traditional equitable test is no
coincidence.'3 As the Supreme Court has observed, "[w]e are dealing here
with the requirements of equity practice with a background of several
hundred years of history." 135 The equitable practices established by the
federal courts have been trained, tested and refined through iteration upon
iteration. As the Supreme Court further declared, "[w]e do not believe
that.., a36major departure from that long tradition... should be lightly
1
implied.
With minor distinctions among circuits, the preliminary injunction
standard for non-section 10(j) or section 10(1) injunctions can be
134. See EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 742 (1st Cir. 1996) (adopting
traditional test over EEOC objections); Gold Coast Publ'ns, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336,
1343 (11th Cir. 1994) (adopting traditional test); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Local Union No.
810, 19 F.3d 786, 789 (2d Cir. 1994) (adopting "now familiar" test); Virginia Carolina
Tools, Inc. v. Int'l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 119 (4th Cir. 1993) (adopting traditional
test); United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op., 833 F.2d 172, 177 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that district courts must follow "well-established principles"); Roland Mach. Co. v.
Dresser Indus., 749 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1984) (adopting preliminary injunction standard
based on long line of cases); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs. Inc., 630 F.2d 120, 137
(3d Cir. 1980) (adopting traditional test); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d
109, 113 (8th Cir. 1977) (explaining that in the traditional test no one factor is
determinative).
135. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,329 (1944).
136. Id. at 330.
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summarized as follows: to be entitled to a preliminary injunction, a litigant
must first demonstrate that there is no adequate remedy at law and that he
or she will suffer irreparable harm that cannot be prevented or fully
rectified after trial if relief is not immediately granted. Courts must also
consider any irreparable harm that the defendant might suffer from the
injunction-harm that would not be cured by either the defendant
ultimately prevailing in the trial or by an injunction bond. The second
threshold a plaintiff must cross is showing some type of likelihood of
succeeding on the merits. Although this threshold is low, 137 it is important
to determine how likely the success is because this determination
ultimately balances the relative harms. The more likely the plaintiff is to
win the underlying litigation, the less heavily the balance of harms must
weigh in his or her favor; the less likely a victory, the greater the need for
the balance of harms to weigh in plaintiffs favor. This is known as the
"sliding scale" approach.'38 Implicit in this approach is the incentive for the
ruling judge to minimize errors. As explained by Judge Posner writing for
a panel of the Seventh Circuit:
The judge must try to avoid the error that is more costly in the
circumstances. That cost is a function of the gravity of the error
if it occurs and the probability that it will occur. The error of
denying an injunction to someone whose legal rights have in fact
been infringed is thus more costly the greater the magnitude of
the harm that the plaintiff will incur from the denial and the
greater the probability that his legal rights really have been
infringed. And similarly the error of granting an injunction to
someone whose legal rights will turn out not to have been
infringed is more costly the greater the magnitude of the harm to
the defendant from the injunction and the smaller 1the
39 likelihood
that the plaintiffs rights really have been infringed.
The court further noted that while judges have historically needed to
use their "discretionary" powers to rule on requested injunctive relief, in
fact, the analytical procedure is a true legal standard-the factors to be
considered are few and definite. 140 They are to be compared in a particular
sequence and in accordance with a specific formula which requires first
deciding whether the petitioning party has crossed specific thresholds and
then weighing the likely harms from the grant or denial of the injunction
based on the strength of the petitioning party's case.
When a preliminary injunction has consequences beyond the
immediate parties, the public interest must also be added to the weighing
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Ill. Council on Long Term Care v. Bradley, 957 F.2d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1992).
Roland Mach. Co., 749 F.2d at 388.
Id.
Id. at 388-89.
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process. Thus, a court may have to weigh the harm an141injunction will
cause the public against the benefits achieved by the relief.
Like all preliminary relief, section 10(j) relief is exercised without the
advantage of a full adjudication of the facts, involves large scale, high-cost
repercussions, and implicates the concerns of persons not directly
associated with the litigation.'4 2 The section 10(j) injunction is an
"extraordinary tool because it injects the legal system into disputes before a
full airing of the facts and a careful consideration of the law, and mistakes
can be costly."' 43 Thus, consideration of all the traditional protections and
factors-including likelihood of success on the merits and balance of
harms-is no less important in section 10(j) cases than in any other context.
As the First Circuit explains, in section 10(j) cases, "where the preliminary
relief is essentially the final relief sought, the likelihood of success should
be strong."' 144 To ensure that parties' rights are not trampled on, to ensure
that an extraordinary remedy be adjudicated fairly, impartially, and
consistently, the answer is straightforward: courts should analyze section
10() cases under the traditional standard of equitable relief. This approach
offers consistency, clarity, and fairness. In short, the section 10(j)
injunction, in most respects, should be analyzed and adjudicated no
differently than any other request for preliminary injunctive relief.
B.

The Eliminationof "ReasonableCause"

As recent circuit court decisions have concluded, the "reasonable
cause" prong is not an appropriate test to be used in section 10(j)
injunctions. 45 Surely, if Congress wanted "reasonable cause" to be used in
any aspect of the section 10(j) proceeding, the language would have been
included in the section. The fact that Congress only used the language in

141. Kinney v. Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485, 490 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing West Allis
Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 253 (7th Cir. 1998)).
142. Section 10j) relief implicates the interest of individuals not associated with the
proceedings, including workers who lose jobs to reinstatement orders and subcontractors.

See Maram v. Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, Inc., 722 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1983)
(holding subcontractor loses janitorial contract with company when injunction restores

discharged janitorial employees).
143. Kinney v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 994 F.2d 1271, 1277 (7th Cir. 1993); see

also Calatrello v. "Automatic" Sprinkler Corp. of Am., 55 F.3d 208, 215 (6th Cir. 1995)
(seeking injunction would require company to spend more than six million dollars to restore
operations); Miller v. LCF, Inc., No. 94-3372, 1994 WL 669837, at *1-*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov.
29, 1994) (seeking to enjoin company from closing facility before a union representation
election, even though that operation had lost millions of dollars).
144. Asseo v. Pan Am. Grain Co., 805 F.2d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 1986).
145. Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 457 (9th Cir. 1994); Kinney v.

Pioneer Press, 881 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1989).
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section 10(1) is telling and determinative. 146 As pointed out in DAmico v.
UnitedStates Service Industries,Inc.:147
For Congress to have required that "reasonable cause" be shown
would make no sense under Section 10() because the
"reasonable cause" determination required by Section 10(1)
focuses on the preliminary investigation before the issuance of a
formal complaint, a point that already has passed under Section
10(), rather than the likely 1success
of prevailing on the merits of
4
the already-filed complaint.
In sum, "reasonable cause" may be the inquiry the Board (or
its Regional Attorney) must conduct in determining whether to
file a complaint, but the courts, in determining what is "just and
proper," should employ the familiar standards customarily used
in suits seeking injunctions. 4 9
The result of the misunderstood merging of section 10(j) and section
10(1) standards is confusion and unnecessary deference for the Board's
prosecution of the section 10(j) case. 150 It is readily apparent why the
Board advocates the use of the "reasonable cause" prong in both section
10(j) and section 10(1) actions.' 51 The extreme deference created by the
15 2
interpretation of the term creates a virtual rubber stamp for the Board.
And as case after case illustrates, this deference seeps into a court's analysis
146. As the Supreme Court has observed, where a question of federal law turns on a
statute and the intention of Congress, a court must first look to the statutory language and
then to the legislative history, if the language is unclear. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
896 (1984).
147. 867 F. Supp. 1075 (D.D.C. 1994).
148. Id. at 1083 (citing CaliforniaPacific, 19 F.3d at457).
149. Id. at 1085 (citing PioneerPress, 881 F.2d at 490).
150. The PioneerPress court also notes the complex body of law concerning standards
of appellate review that reasonable cause has spawned. PioneerPress, 881 F.2d at 491.
151. Whether reasonable cause should be a factor courts use to determine the propriety
of injunctive relief under section 10(1) is also in dispute. The likelihood of success criteria
tends to eliminate the need for reasonable cause in both section 10(j) and section 10(1) cases.
See Kinney v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, 994 F.2d 1271, 1278 (7th Cir.
1993). Some commentators posit that reasonable cause should be solely confined to the
Board's decision about whether or not to bring a petition for injunctive relief under section
10(1). A careful reading of section 10(1) certainly seems to support the proposition that the
term reasonable cause is used in relation to the NLRB's actions and is separate and distinct
from the limited guidance provided to the courts. See CaliforniaPacific, 19 F.3d at 456.
But see Maram v. Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico, Inc., 722 F.2d 953, 958 (1st
Cir. 1983) (noting that because of the special importance Congress attaches to section 10(1)
offenses, there is a strong presumption of irreparable harm, with the balance in favor of the
charging party and public interest favoring an injunction and therefore the judicial inquiry
should be whether there is reasonable cause to believe an offense had been committed).
152. See Boire v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1975).
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153
and interpretation of whether injunctive relief is just and proper.
Although the issuance of a complaint is the prerequisite for a section 10(j)
relief, the rationale behind the decision to issue the complaint does not
seem to be intended by Congress to be controlling regarding the
appropriateness of such relief. As the California Pacific court explained,
"the level of belief required to proceed1 54to court cannot equate with the level
of proof required to succeed in court.

C.

"Justand Proper"Means TraditionalEquity

The standard for determining the propriety of injunctive relief under
section 10(j) is simply through an interpretation of the term "just and
proper". The "just and proper" standard serves as the guidepost for courts
when faced with an injunction request by the Board. What "just and
proper" actually means has been disputed. Yet when considering the
language of the provision, and its lack of congressional guidance, it is clear,
as a number of courts have now concluded, that the term "just and proper"
simply refers to traditional equitable criteria.
Significantly, there is an absence of legislative history concerning the
meaning of "justand proper." In fact, as stated previously, there is minimal
history dealing with section 10() or section 10(1) in general. The debates
that did center on these sections primarily focused on section 10(1). In
addition,
the House version of the Act did not even contain a section
155
10(j).

153. A good illustration of this point can be found in the case of Dunbar v. Landis
Plastics, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 169 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). The court, in denying the employer's
discovery requests and an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of considering the just and
proper issue, stated:
Because of the extreme deference to which the NLRB is entitled on the
"reasonable cause" prong of the Section 10G) test, I need not conduct a formal
evidentiary hearing. The injunction proceedings in federal court must not
evolve into a hearing on the merits of the unfair labor practice charges because
the district court must not usurp the NLRB's role. Moreover, even though the
"just and proper" prong lies more fully within the court's discretion, it is not an
avenue by which I can decide the merits of the underlying unfair labor practice
charges.
Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
In Pioneer Press, the court noted that the district court devoted the bulk of its
attention to reasonable cause and only one page to the question of whether the injunction
was appropriate. 881 F.2d at 493. See also Silverman v. J.R.L. Food Corp., 196 F.3d 334
(2d Cir. 1999) (ignoring the just and proper analysis and solely focusing on reasonable
cause).
154. 19 F.3d at 457.
155. Section 12 of the House of Representative's version of the Act provided the federal
courts with independent jurisdiction over cases involving concerted violations and would
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It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that Congress knew of the
approach used by courts when faced with labor injunctions in the past-the
abuses that were seemingly addressed by Norris-LaGuardia. 5 6 Congress
was also aware of the traditional equitable criteria courts had used in
deciding both labor and other preliminary injunctions. Yet there was no
call to change the courts' perspective on labor injunctions, only the generic
phrase "just and proper". To argue that courts should view labor
injunctions under section 10(j) or section 10(1) as anything other than
preliminary injunctions is simply not supported by the legislative history.
It is likely that the term "just and proper" was lifted from sections 10(e) and
(f) of the Wagner Act, passed twelve years before.117 In both sections,
dealing with enforcement of Board orders, appellate courts have the power
to grant temporary relief as they deem just and proper.'58
1.

Supreme Court Review

The Supreme Court has provided guidance when faced with statutory
ambiguity regarding preliminary relief with the cases of Hecht v. Bowles'59
60
and Weinbergerv. Romero-Barcelo1

In Hecht, a case decided during World War II, the Court was asked to

have permitted private parties to commence actions for injunctive relief. Note, Temporary
Injunctions Under Section IO(j) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 190-191
(1969) (citing H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., § 12(b) (1st Sess., 1947)).
156. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in 1932, just fifteen years before the TaftHartley Act.
157. The United States Code states:
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United
States... for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief
or restraining order .... Upon the filing of such petition the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have
jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall
have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just
and proper.
29 U.S.C. § 160(e); see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (detailing the review of final order of the
Board on petition to the court).
158. It is interesting to note that cases interpreting the just and proper standard under
sections 10(e) and (f) have used the two-prong analysis of section 100) to determine the
propriety of injunctive relief. See NLRB v. United States Serv. Indus., Inc., 152 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3038 (D.C. Cir. 1996); NLRB v. Hecek's Inc., 390 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1968)
(determining that the Board has not met the standard of the two-prong analysis to obtain
temporary relief under section 10(e)); NLRB v. Aerovox, 389 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1967)
(affirming the use of the two-prong analysis for cases under 10(e) and holding that the
government is not required to show irreparable injury when it seeks an injunction to give
effect to an act of Congress).
159. 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
160. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
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interpret the phrase "shall be granted" as used in the temporary and
permanent injunction provision found in section 205(e) of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942. The Act stated that an injunction "shall be
granted" upon application by a government administration. In determining
that "shall be granted" does not mandate an injunction merely because the
Price Administrator of the Office of Price Administration requested it, the
Court held:
We cannot but think that if Congress had intended to make such a
drastic departure from the traditions of equity practice, an
unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made.
... We are dealing here with the requirements of equity
practice with a background of several hundred years of
history ....
The historic injunctive process was designed to
deter, not to punish. The essence of equity jurisdiction has been
the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each
decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather
than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment
and reconciliation between the public interest and the private
needs as well as between competing private claims. We do not
believe that such a major departure from that long tradition as is
here proposed should be lightly implied .... It is therefore even
more compelling to conclude that, if Congress desired to make
such an abrupt departure from traditional eguity
practice as is
T
suggested, it would have made its desire plain. 6
Thirty-eight years later, the Court in Weinbergerrevisited the problem
of statutory ambiguity in the injunctive relief context in an action brought
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. In 1978, the Governor of
Puerto Rico, among others, sued to enjoin Navy military training
operations on a small island off the Puerto Rican coast. The district court
found that the Navy violated the Federal Water Pollution Control Act by
discharging ordnance into the waters surrounding the island without first
obtaining a permit from the EPA. 162 However, the district court refused to
enjoin the action. 63 The court of appeals reversed the district court,
holding that the district court erred in undertaking a traditional balancing
test, concluding that the statutory section provides for an absolute
obligation to stop pollutants until the permit procedure was followed.164
Citing Hecht, the Supreme Court asserted that in the absence of strong
161. Hecht, 321 U.S. at 329-30.
162. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 307-08.
163. Id. at 310 (finding that granting the injunctive relief would actually cause harm to
the nation because of the importance of the island as a trading center).
164. Id. at311.
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congressional intent courts should follow traditional criteria when
considering preliminary injunctions:
These commonplace considerations applicable to cases in which
injunctions are sought in the federal courts reflect "a practice
with a background of several hundred years of history,"... a
practice of which Congress is assuredly well aware. Of course,
Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the
courts' discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has
intended to depart from established principles. 65
Thus, the Court held that Congress did not intend to deny courts the
discretion to rely on remedies other than an immediate prohibitory
injunction. 166 In its decision the Court cited the case of Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.,'67 which held:
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is
not to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid
legislative command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a
necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's
jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be
recognized and applied. "The great principles of equity, securing
complete justice, should
" 168 not be yielded to light inferences, or
doubtful construction.

Significantly, the Portercase was decided only one year before the
Taft-Hartley Act. Because there was certainly no conclusive legislative
command from Congress rejecting a traditional approach to the grant of
equitable relief under section 10(), the Supreme Court mandates that courts
interpreting the "just and proper" language of section 10(j) and section
10(1) not depart from established equitable principles.
2.

Other Labor Injunctions

Petitions under section 10(j) and/or section 10(1) are not the only
instances in which courts are faced with an interlocutory order dealing with
labor-related issues. And while the term "just and proper" plays no part in
the analyses in those other cases, it is telling that other courts in laborrelated injunctions apply traditional equitable criteria. For example, in
1970, the Supreme Court in Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local
770,169 held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not prohibit a court from
enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation where the agreement
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 313.
Id. at 320; see also Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
328 U.S. 395 (1946).
Id. at 398 (citation omitted).

169. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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contained dispute resolution procedures dealing with the issues that
precipitated the strike. 170 In positing that courts should be able to consider
the propriety of an injunction when it is necessary to preserve the integrity
of the arbitral process, the court held that district courts must consider
whether the issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary
analysis and whether
principles of equity, including a balance of harms
7
irreparable injury will be caused to the employer.1 1
Under a Boys Market analysis, courts continue to use traditional
equitable principles to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate in
disputes under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. For example, in American
Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service,172 the Second Circuit
held that, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction under a Boys Market
analysis, a party must show: (a) irreparable harm and (b) either (1)
likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance
tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the preliminary
of hardships
173
relief.
In addition, district courts use traditional equitable criteria when
adjudicating preliminary injunctions brought under the Railway Labor Act
("RLA").' 74 Whereas the Wagner Act stresses administrative adjudication,
while the RLA primarily relies on mediation, both acts deal with similar
issues and concerns. 1' s Whether a major or minor dispute under the RLA,
courts issuing injunctions rely on traditional equitable criteria to reach a
decision. 76 In Brotherhoodof Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-Kansas170. Id. at 252.
171. Id. at 253.
172. 766 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1985).
173. Id. at720.
174. See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
Local 787 v. Textron, 919 F. Supp. 783, 789 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (in determining whether an
injunction should issue, the court "must carefully weigh four factors: (1) whether the
movant has demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the
movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue; (3) whether granting
the injunction will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether
granting the injunction serves the public interest").
175. But see Air Line Pilots Assoc. v. United Air Lines Inc., 802 F.2d 886, 897-98 (7th
Cir. 1986) (cautioning that simply because a practice is deemed unlawful under the NLRA
does not automatically translate into a finding that the same practice is unlawful under the
RLA).
176. See Nat'l Ry. Labor Conference v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists, 830 F.2d 741 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that the district court was under an obligation to apply the traditional
standards necessary for determining whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction, as well
as to heed the particular concerns presented by the requirements of the RLA); Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., v. United Transp. Union, 734 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1984)
(applying traditional equitable standards in light of the specific requirements of the RLA); S.
Pac. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 393 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
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Texas Railway Co.,177 the Supreme Court held that the district court is free
to exercise the typical powers of a court of equity and stated that "[s]ince
the power to condition relief is essential to ensure that extraordinary
equitable remedies will not become the engines of injustice, it would
require 1the
clearest legislative direction to justify the truncation of that
78
power.
While there are differences between the RLA and the NLRA, it is
difficult to discern why actions brought under the RLA for injunctive relief
should be treated differently than actions brought under section 10(j), or,
for that matter, actions brought under a Boys Market analysis.
Interestingly, under section 7123(d) of the Federal Service LaborManagement Relations Act, courts also have jurisdiction to grant
temporary relief if it is found to be just and proper. 79 That Act, however,
distinguishes itself from section 10() by further stating that "a court shall
not grant temporary relief under this Section if it would interfere with the
ability of the agency to carry out its essential functions or if the authority
fails to establish probable cause that an unfair labor practice is being
committed.""18 According to Reuben ex rel. Federal Labor Relations
Authority v. FDIC"", the District Court for the District of Columbia
attempted to define "just and proper" under section 7123(d). s2 A court
retains discretion to exercise traditional equitable judgment under a "just
and proper" analysis. "That conclusion flows from the express language of
the statute in providing that the Court has jurisdiction to grant any
temporary relief it considers just and proper. This sequence of words
('any,' 'it considers,' 'just and proper') is consistent with notions of
discretion and equity. 183

(holding that it is the general power of an equity court to impose conditions on those who
seek equitable relief where an injunction is sought to enforce the provisions of the RLA).
177. 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
178. Id. at 532.
179. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(d) (1978). Other statutes have used "just and proper" language to
provide guidance for courts in determining whether to issue injunctive relief. See Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(k) (1988); Foreign Service Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4109 (1998).
Unfortunately, there have been no cases uncovered interpreting the "just and proper"
language under those statutes.
180. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(d).
181. 760 F. Supp. 934 (D.D.C. 1991).
182. Id. at 938-40. The court found it extremely difficult to interpret the term probable
cause. The court even attempted to analogize to the section 10() reasonable cause
requirement, but found there to be no unanimity on that requirement. See also United States
v. PATCO, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 160, 163 n.3 (D.D.C. 1981) ("Section 7123 of Title 5
incorporates standards similar to those which are traditional to courts of equity").
183. Reuben, 760 F. Supp. at 941-42.
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A New Approach

Courts generally agree that an injunction is an extraordinary measure
and should only be granted in those instances in which the normal
functions of the judicial or administrative system in question cannot protect
a litigant from irreparable harm. 1 84 Clearly, for a court to consider
imposing a remedy without a full adjudication of the facts, the situation
must be one in which no other alternative exists. Judges must issue
preliminary remedies with the greatest concern for the rights of the parties
and the potentially devastating effect the temporary relief may have on a
party. In labor disputes, the decision whether to issue an injunction under
section 10(j) or section 10(1), in many instances, has high cost
consequences. Review of this issue has become especially important in
light of the Board's recent aggressive use of the section 10() injunction. 85
Yet the two-prong approach, still favored by many circuits for its excessive
deference to the Board, seems to disregard the ramifications of the
injunction, while rubber-stamping the Board's interpretation of the facts.
Even among the circuits employing the traditional approach, the
Board is successful a vast majority of the time. From 1994 to 1998, the
Board obtained a successful resolution in 88% of section 10() petition
cases. 8 6 With an increased use of the injunction, it is more likely that there
will be cases that have little merit entering the judiciary for temporary
relief. In light of its increased use and powerful impact, the two-prong
approach does not adequately protect those defending against a section
10(j) petition.
The traditional equitable approach not only will balance the harms, but
it will balance the results. The consequence of analyzing the "just and
proper" test under a traditional equitable approach as opposed to other "just
and proper" standards-most significantly the "frustration of the remedial
purposes of the act" standard-is significant." 7 The traditional equitable
184. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 312, 312-13 (1982).
185. In 1997, a total of fifty-two injunctions were sought by the Board, thirty-five of
which were brought under section 10(j). 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 160 (1997). During the 14
month period from July 1, 1998 through August 31, 1999, the Board authorized a total of
fifty-seven section 10() injunctions. NLRB GEN. COUNs. REP. (released Nov. 2, 1999),
available at http:llwww.nlrb.gov/press/r2347.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2000). This is in
stark contrast to the average of eleven section 10(j) injunctions authorized for the first thirty
years after passage of Taft-Hartley (1948-1977). See Bums, supra note 64, at 1027.
186. NLRB GEN. CouNs. REP. (released July 23, 1998) (regarding the utilization of
section 10(j) injunction proceedings from Mar. 3, 1994 through Mar. 2, 1998), available at
http:llwww.nlrb.gov/press/r2302.html.
187. In D'Amico v. Townsend Culinary Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 480 (D. Md. 1998), the court
held that the key distinction between the just and proper analysis and the equitable approach
is the irreparable injury component. The traditional reading of just and proper does not
require a showing of irreparable injury, only that injunctive relief would restore the pre-

290

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 3:2

approach allows the court to balance the equities. The key component of
the general preliminary injunction standard is the ability of the judge to
balance the harms, weigh the effects of the possible injunctive relief and
consider the consequences, and, in short, balance the equities. The
foundation for the balancing of the equities approach is the sliding scale
which entails consideration of the likelihood of a successful suit.
With respect to eliminating the "reasonable cause" standard and
implementing a likelihood of success on the merits component, one key
distinction is that under the two-prong approach, "reasonable cause" was a
black and white resolution, with the resolution nearly always favoring the
petitioning Board."' Once the standard was established, the legalities of
the case became irrelevant in deciding whether an injunction was just and
proper. Thus, regardless of whether the Board petitioned the court with an
extremely egregious and obvious case of unfair labor practices or with a
somewhat tenuous case, once reasonable cause was established, the
strength or weakness of the case became irrelevant.
The equitable approach permits judges not only to consider the
potential harm the petitioner will suffer due to the lengthy Board
proceedings, but it will permit judges to weigh this harm against the
potential harm a respondent will suffer from preliminary relief as well1 89
Further, it will truly enable and compel a judge to consider the relative
merit of the underlying case. And while deference to the Board may still
be contemplated, such deference will no longer rise to the level of a rubberstamp.
Proponents of keeping the "reasonable cause" standard, notably the
Board, fear that the elimination of the prong may dissipate the deference
afforded to the Board.1 90 Why a likelihood of success standard would
violation status quo, serve the public interest, and further the remedial purposes of the Act.
Id. at 484-85 (citing NLRB v. Aerovox Corp., 389 F.2d 475, 477 (4th Cir. 1967)).
188. See supra notes 80-82.
189. A balance of harms analysis may not prove to be so detrimental to the Board. For
example, in conducting the balance of harms analysis, the court in Overstreet v. Thomas
Davis Medical Centers., P.C., 9 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (D. Ariz. 1997) stated:
The court finds that in weighing the balance of hardships the union will lose
more should an injunction not be granted than the Respondent will lose if an
injunction be granted .... The imposition of a bargaining order is not unduly
burdensome on Respondent because it is not permanent, and any agreement
between the parties can contain a condition subsequent to take into account the
possibility of the Board or the court of appeals rejecting the Regional Director's
decision. Additionally, the bargaining order requires only that Respondent meet
with the Union and bargain in good faith, it does not compel Respondent to
agree to any particular terms or conditions of employment.
Id. at 1167.
190. See Miller v. CaliforniaPacificMedical Center, 19 F.3d 448, 458 (9th Cir. 1994),
in which the Board argues, in part, that the district court's lack of jurisdiction over unfair
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change the deference afforded to the Board is unclear. In both instances, a
court can defer to the Board's interpretation of the law. As the California
Pacific court states, "[w]hile the district court is not required to defer to the
Board in deciding whether interim relief is 'just and proper,' it should
evaluate the probabilities of the complaining party prevailing in light of the
fact that ultimately, the Board's determination on the merits will be given
considerable deference." 191 More than likely, the concern is that judges,
using the likelihood of success factor, will delve deeper into the legal issues
and possibly question the need for Board deference.
It is important to note that the regional director at the section 10(j)
stage is not a neutral body-it is a prosecutorial one with a particular axe to
grind. There is often "a great disconnect between prosecutorial perception
and factual and legal reality.' 92 The adjudicative process consists of
numerous stages, "including hearing and recommendation by an
administrative law judge (ALJ), review and decision by the NLRB, and
judicial review by the courts of appeals."'93 The unfair labor practice
complaint is the first step in this process. 194 "At any of these stages of the
process, the General Counsel's view of the facts and the law may be, and
often is, rejected.' 95 "It is not uncommon for the ALJ to rule against the
General Counsel because of a different view of the facts, the law, or both.
Similarly, it is not uncommon for the Board to overturn an AU decision
that found in favor of the General Counsel.' 9 6 While it can be argued that
some type of deference should be afforded to the Board when bringing an
injunction, it is clear that courts should consider the Board's position with
the proverbial grain of salt. 97 The reasoning behind granting deferencelabor practice complaints and the limited and deferential review of Board decisions by the
court of appeals is evidence of Congress' intent to give the Board a high level of deference
in section 10(j) proceedings. The Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's rationale, focusing on
the fact that the NLRA provisions that require deference to the Board spell it out clearly.
See also 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (mandating that on petition for enforcement of its order, the
Board's factual findings shall be deemed "conclusive" if supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole). Under section 10(), there is no requirement for
deference, only that an injunction, if ordered, be "just and proper." Id.
191. CaliforniaPacific, 19 F.3d at 460.
192. Brief of Amici Curiae of LPA and The American Trucking Association, Inc. in
support of Petitioner at 13, Kobell v. Beverly Health & Rehab. Serv., Inc., 142 F.3d 428 (3d
Cir. 1998) (Nos. 97-3200,97-3357), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999) (No. 98-492).
193. Id. at 12.
194. Id.
195. Id. For example, in 1997 only 70% of cases in which the Board petitioned for
enforcement and/or review of a Board order were affirmed in full by appellate courts. From
1992 to 1996, the Board's success rate was 69%. 62 NLRB ANN.REP. 159, Table 19 A

(1997).
196. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 192, at 12-13.
197. For example, during the period from March 3, 1994 through March 2, 1998,
regional offices submitted 708 cases with a recommendation for section 10(j) relief. The
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the Board's expertise on NLRA matters--also fails to ring true. Courts are
routinely able to handle complex matters in a preliminary injunction
context, and it is simply unfair to defer to the Board's view of the merits.
The use of a traditional approach also will provide courts and litigants
the necessary consistency and guidance that is so severely lacking at the
present time. The traditional approach to preliminary injunctions will
promote uniformity among circuits, not only with respect to the standards
used by courts in determining the propriety of injunctive relief, but with
respect to evidentiary standards, discovery, and all other aspects of the
historically litigated preliminary injunction."
This consistency and
guidance is dependent on courts not analyzing the traditional equitable
factors through a "prism" or a deferential cloud. Instead, courts should
simply apply the equitable factors with the same unadorned clarity as the
court would do with any other interlocutory decision.
Certainly, when considering irreparable harm and adequate remedy of
law, the court must take into account the length of the Board processes, the
ability of the Board to remedy the situation at a later time, and the
effectiveness of such a remedy. 99 And while these questions go to the
heart of irreparable injury and adequate remedy of law, they should not be
the sine qua non of the injunction analysis. The court must also consider
the effect an injunction has on the respondent and whether the Board is
likely to win the underlying suit.
Furthermore, the statutory language of section 10(j) can be read in no
general counsel sought authorization for 313 (44%) of those cases. Subsequently, the Board
authorized 292 proceedings (93%) of those cases. Thus, 41% of cases in which regional
offices originally sought section 10(j) relief were ultimately authorized by the Board.
NLRB GEN. CouNs. REP., supra note 186.
198. In former General Counsel Frederick Feinstein's four year report, Feinstein
downplayed the circuit court conflict dealing with section 10j) standards. Feinstein stated
that equitable considerations such as irreparable harm to the Board's remedial powers, the
harm an injunction may pose on the respondent, and considerations of public interest have
always played a part in the just and proper analysis. In addition, Feinstein stated that "the
district court's limited inquiry into the merits of the unfair labor practice case and its
deference to the Board's expertise, represented by the historic 'reasonable cause' test, are
also acknowledged in the 'traditional equity' circuits." Id. Feinstein cited Califonzia
Pacific, holding that regional directors need only produce "some evidence to support the
unfair labor practice charge together with an arguable legal theory," and Electro-Voice,
finding that "the district court has no jurisdiction to pass on the merits of the unfair labor
practice; the Director satisfies the threshold 'likelihood of success' element by showing that
his or her chance of success is 'better than negligible."' Id.
199. See Sharp v. Parents in Cmty. Action, Inc., 172 F.3d 1034, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999)
(discussing the Board's ability to remedy alleged unfair labor practices); Scott v. Pac.
Custom Materials, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Sharp v. Tri-State Mech., Inc.,
No. 95-C-0392-C, 1995 WL 661101 at *4 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 1995) (discussing delays
inherent in the NLRB resolution process); Zipp v. Caterpillar, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 794, 801
(C.D. Ill. 1994) (discussing length of time necessary to resolve these types of labor
disputes).
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other way than to treat the injunction as courts have treated other
injunctions. There is no language about different standards in the Act or in
its legislative history. This interpretation is also consistent with Supreme
Court precedent that, absent statutory language, statutory injunctions
should be considered based on the traditional notions of equity.2 ° Perhaps
even more importantly, using a traditional method will promote fairness to
the litigants and prove a consistent guide for practitioners and the courts
when faced with the prospect of a section 10(j) injunction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Without the historical fear that has surrounded it, the labor injunction
would likely be treated as any other preliminary injunction. 201 It is now
time for the fear that permeated the judiciary for decades to dissipate.
Protection against judicial abuse is statutorily mandated.0 2 Courts
generally do not have jurisdiction to take labor matters out of the hands of
the administrative agencies, and the days of courts placing their own
particular imprimatur on labor issues and policies are long gone. When a
case is brought before the judiciary, it is imperative that the courts use the
tools and expertise that they have developed over the years with respect to
injunctions. There is no reason for injunctions under section 10(j) to be
treated any differently than any other injunction. The temporary injunction
remedy impacts employers and unions in the same way it impacts private
parties. Thus, all the safeguards and procedures used in "regular"
injunctions certainly have a needed place in the labor injunction.

200. See supra text accompanying notes 158-167.
201. For example, in Samoff v. Teamsters Local 115, 338 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
the court determined that there was reasonable cause to find that a union engaged in
prohibited organizational picketing. However, it urged the appellate court to allow an
unclean hands determination to be used when analyzing just and proper due to the employer
also engaging in unfair labor practices:
Having stated the law, we feel constrained to observe that there must be some
cases where the conduct of the employer is so damnable that, notwithstanding
the public character of the lawsuit, the Court, out of conscience, ought to be
permitted to apply the "unclean hands" doctrine, and deny injunctive relief that
benefits a wrongdoer. In making this observation, we are not unmindful of the
historic Congressional fear of federal courts becoming too deeply involved in
labor disputes without the aid of initial adjudication by an expert agency, and
the reticence of Congress to confer injunctive power upon federal judges in
labor disputes.
Id. at 867.
202. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1998).

